Premanism in Indonesia is commonly portrayed through a sensationalist lens, as the violent activities of street thugs extorting money from small vendors or enforcing control in urban neighbourhoods. However, this perspective overlooks the deeper structural realities that make such phenomena not only possible but, in some areas, normalized. Premanism is not merely the product of deviant individuals; it is the manifestation of a chronic failure in Indonesia’s state institutions. The rise and persistence of preman networks expose the weakness, corruption, and inefficiency embedded in systems meant to uphold justice, protect citizens, and ensure equitable governance.
One notable instance that sheds light on the deeper issues surrounding premanism in Indonesia is the ongoing control over street vendors in urban areas like Jakarta. In recent months, there have been reports of preman networks imposing “security fees” on small-scale vendors selling their goods on the streets. These vendors are often forced to pay for “protection” against theft, harassment, or even police crackdowns. In some cases, the preman collect these fees not only from street vendors but also from parking attendants, small businesses, and even taxi drivers.
Bureaucrats—government officials responsible for managing public administration—can become complicit in premanism by using their positions of authority to demand bribes or facilitate extortion schemes. A real example of this can be seen in the way certain bureaucrats manipulate public services for personal or political gain, particularly in cases where business permits or land use permits are involved.
In several Indonesian regions, bureaucrats are reported to work with preman groups to extort businesses or property developers. For instance, when a business seeks a permit for construction, local bureaucrats may delay or withhold approval unless the developers pay an “unofficial fee.” The developer may then be referred to preman who will “ensure” the process moves forward for a price. The bureaucrat might receive a cut of this payment. This creates a system where the state itself becomes an enabler of extortion, and businesses are forced to comply because the alternatives (like facing long delays or even facing the closure of their operations) are not viable.
In a 2019 investigation, businesses in Jakarta and other major cities reported paying “protection” fees to preman, often facilitated by local officials who were part of the racket. These bureaucratic failures directly contribute to the normalization of premanism, making it part of the everyday functioning of local governance.
The role of the police in premanism is perhaps the most directly linked to the criminal elements of the phenomenon. There are multiple documented cases where police officers have either facilitated or protected preman operations, turning a blind eye to extortion in exchange for bribes or other benefits.
While the police may be more directly involved in extortion schemes with preman, the Indonesian military (TNI) also plays a role, especially in terms of political influence and economic activities. The TNI’s involvement in premanism tends to be linked to areas of influence where military personnel may be tasked with maintaining public order or securing resources in regions with weak governance structures.
The extortion is not just an isolated criminal activity but a reflection of deeper institutional failures. These areas of Jakarta, like many others in Indonesia, are rife with weak governance structures, where law enforcement is either complicit in the extortion or too under-resourced to intervene effectively. The police, in some cases, turn a blind eye to preman activities or, in other instances, are seen as indirectly benefiting from these informal systems. This is not just a problem in Jakarta but a broader issue that impacts the nation’s urban poor.
To understand and confront premanism, one must look beyond surface-level criminality and toward the architecture of the Indonesian state itself. This paper argues that premanism is a symptom of structural failure—a reflection of broken institutions, ethical erosion in public service, and a loss of legitimacy that disempowers citizens and fosters informal violence. Ethical and philosophical insights are essential to this critique, for at its core, premanism is not just a failure of law enforcement—it is a failure of justice.
Structural Failure as the Root of Premanism
Indonesia’s institutional landscape is marred by endemic corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and selective enforcement of the law. In theory, the state is designed to mediate conflicts, deliver public services, and uphold the rule of law. In practice, however, many of these functions have either collapsed or been co-opted by private interests. When citizens cannot access justice through courts, when government services are only available via bribery, and when police protect criminal syndicates instead of civilians, structural failure has already taken root (Aspinall & van Klinken, 2011).
The vacuum left by weak institutions is quickly filled by informal power brokers—preman. These actors may use intimidation and violence, but their power is derived not solely from coercion. Rather, it comes from the absence or dysfunction of legitimate structures. When state systems do not work, people turn to those who can make things work, even if through extralegal means. Preman collect informal taxes (“security fees”) from market vendors, control parking and transportation hubs, and act as intermediaries in property disputes—not because the public prefers them, but because there are few viable alternatives.
A key feature of this structural dysfunction is the complicity of state actors. Premanism is not simply tolerated; it is often enabled and legitimized through political and bureaucratic alliances. Local officials may deploy preman to mobilize votes during elections or to control dissent. Police forces may ignore, or even protect, preman operations in exchange for financial incentives. In some cases, bureaucrats rely on these informal networks to implement unpopular policies or extract additional fees from already overburdened citizens (Hadiz, 2004).
This collusion blurs the line between legality and criminality. When the state is entangled with informal power structures, governance becomes opaque and arbitrary. Authority is no longer grounded in law or moral duty, but in negotiated power arrangements. In such a system, the citizen is rendered powerless—both legally and morally. The result is not just disorder but injustice.
From a philosophical standpoint, the rise of premanism can be seen as the breakdown of the social contract. According to philosophers such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the legitimacy of the state rests on its ability to protect the rights and welfare of its citizens. When the state fails to do so, its moral authority is undermined. In the context of Indonesia, structural failure reflects a fundamental betrayal of this contract. Citizens pay taxes, obey laws, and engage in civic life with the expectation of reciprocal protection and justice. When this reciprocity is broken, and informal violence replaces lawful governance, the state’s moral legitimacy collapses.
From an ethical standpoint, the erosion of public service values—such as integrity, transparency, and impartiality—feeds the very conditions that sustain premanism. The public sector must be driven not only by efficiency but by virtue ethics—the cultivation of moral character among public servants. As Aristotle emphasized, justice is not merely about legal codes but about the formation of a just society through virtuous action. In Indonesia’s current context, many public officials prioritize self-enrichment and political expediency over public service, deepening distrust and weakening civic institutions.
The consequences of premanism are far-reaching. Economically, it imposes a hidden tax on businesses, especially in the informal sector. Entrepreneurs must factor extortion into their operating costs, which discourages investment and entrenches poverty. Politically, premanism distorts democratic processes by mobilizing coercion in place of debate, and by entrenching local oligarchies who wield informal power through fear rather than accountability (Wilson, 2015).
Premanism also erodes social capital—the trust and networks that underpin a healthy civic life. When communities are governed by fear instead of law, solidarity weakens, and individuals become more isolated and vulnerable. Trust in the state diminishes, not only among the poor but across all levels of society. This leads to a broader disillusionment with democratic institutions and the possibility of meaningful reform.
Path Forward: Institutional and Civic Reform
If Indonesia is to move beyond premanism, the solution cannot be limited to policing or repression. Structural reform must address the root causes of institutional weakness. This includes strengthening law enforcement capacity, ensuring judicial independence, and reforming bureaucratic processes to eliminate corruption. Equally important is the restoration of ethical governance—public institutions must be staffed by individuals who see public service not as a source of personal gain, but as a moral responsibility.
Moreover, civil society must be empowered to demand transparency and accountability. Civic education, rights awareness, and community-based oversight are essential tools in reclaiming public space from informal violence. Premanism thrives in environments of ignorance and apathy. Empowered citizens, on the other hand, can challenge both informal coercion and formal complicity.
Bibliography
- Aspinall, E., & van Klinken, G. (Eds.). (2011). The State and Illegality in Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Hadiz, V. R. (2004). Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives. Development and Change, 35(4), 697-718.
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1762). The Social Contract. (G.D.H. Cole, Trans.). London: Dent, 1913.
- Locke, J. (1689). Two Treatises of Government. London: Awnsham Churchill.
- Aristotle. (c. 350 BCE). Nicomachean Ethics. (W.D. Ross, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, I. D. (2015). The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia: Coercive Capital, Authority and Street Politics. London: Routledge.
